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Abstract 
 
Recently there have been calls from policymakers around the world for practically engaged 
research to produce evidence-based policy for peace, security, and development. Policymakers 
aim to align three types of methodological approaches to knowledge about peace, security and 
development in international order: methodological liberalism at state and international levels, 
aligned with ‘methodological everydayism’, in order to constrain methodological nationalism. 
Policy operates through broad forms of intervention, spanning military, governmental, and 
developmental processes, which scholarship is expected to refine. Critical scholarship is 
sensitive about the subsequent ‘interventionary order’, however, often connecting 
methodological everydayism with global justice frameworks rather than methodological 




“Sir Philip Mitchell, later colonial governor of Uganda, Fiji, and Kenya, responded to 
Malinowski’s claims [that the British government needed the support of 
Anthropologists] with great scepticism, emphatically expressing a preference for the 





Recent calls from elites and policymakers around the world for practically engaged research to 
produce evidence-based policy, for empirical and ‘big-data’ incursions into the ‘local’ and 
‘everyday’, relate to a number of significant processes in contemporary international relations. 
They include constraining or facilitating military and humanitarian intervention, peace 
processes and peacebuilding, statebuilding, promoting human rights and democracy, or 
development and modernisation. They are often connected discursively to the goal of everyday 
and hybrid peace as a route to emancipation. The academy is required to support such goals by 
inventing new and useful disciplines (as with Anthropology, mentioned in the above epigraph) 
and recently through more interdisciplinary contributions. 
Since the end of the Cold War, knowledge production in International Relations, peace 
and conflict studies, as well as in international policy settings, tends to focus on advancing 
methodological liberalism.3 This takes the form of both intervention and state governance. It 
aims to align with everyday practices and requires might be termed ‘methodological 
everydayism’,4 in order to constrain methodological nationalism as a historical force of 
disruption.5 Thus, these three forms of methodology (liberalism, nationalism, and 
everydayism) are connected with different epistemological debates on the politics, interests, 
norms, and practices of intervention, requiring a knowledge base to support and legitimate 
them. They represent a methodological nexus of power, used to shape peace, security, 
development, and order in international relations, the state, and in everyday life. 
This article examines how intervention is often presented as supporting a natural 
equilibrium for the states-system6  between power, interests, norms, justice, history, territorial 
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units, and under both global governance and western hegemony. Sovereignty is its dominant 
narrative, disguising how global to local scale processes of intervention maintain a liberal 
international order. Often a ‘far from equilibria’ situation is put down to contextual, cultural, 
social, and historical deficiencies, maintaining unjust political systems. These in turn justify 
the further expansion of ‘interventionary praxis’, including knowledge production, through 
which intervenors refine their engagement with the other.  
Along these lines, knowledge and methods are required for three sites of interventionary 
praxis: the liberal international, the state, and the social or everyday. This production of 
knowledge facilitates ever more refined forms of practical intervention to maintain and extend 
the existing order, rather than on settling subaltern claims for expanded rights and recognition. 
An ‘interventionary order’ has begun to replace the international order as a consequence of the 
growth of the praxis of intervention, drawing on the three main sites of knowledge production 
(the international, the state, and the everyday), producing requisite methodologies. 
The article proceeds by exploring the links between power and intervention, order, and 
knowledge production that produce the interventionary system. It then outlines how this 
process is connected three main sites of praxis: methodological liberalism, nationalism, and 
everydayism. These are the most common sites of knowledge production and praxis in debates 
peace, security, and order, as well as for intervention. The article then turns to a discussion of 
interventionary praxis and its implications for critical thinking about peace. 
 
 
Intervention and Knowledge 
 
The increasing complexity of international order indicates that debates about peace, security, 
order and development tend to become platforms for the development of broad systems of 
intervention, rather than emancipation and global justice. Knowledge production is harnessed 
for intervention to preserve the international and states-system, rather than emancipation, often 
following the antecedents of the older dynamics of trusteeship and ‘native administration’.  
Critical scholars and practitioners in international relations, on the other hand, are often 
extremely sensitive about the risks of interventionary praxis, and yet depend on them to 
advance the cause of peace, security, rights and development. They often aim at surpassing the 
limits of the states-system and territorial sovereignty in doing so, ultimately by connecting 
knowledge drawn from liberal, national, and everyday methodologies with global justice. The 
three main methodological positionalities connected to peace, security, development and order, 
are thus often assumed to be closely aligned in order maintain their legitimacy and capacity: 
but in actual fact their relationality is more a function of power-relations, driven either 
methodological nationalism (as with the 19th Century balance of power system), or if there is 
sufficient political will, methodological liberalism (as with the UN System after World War 
II). 
Paradoxically, an ‘interventionary order’ offers emancipation from war violence, 
structural, and cultural violence. Yet, it also undermines sovereignty and subaltern claims for 
expanded rights beyond the limited set of basic, liberal human rights the international 
community offers. This contradiction means that the epistemic goals of human rights and 
democracy as advocated through the liberal international order since 1948 and 1990 
respectively, of social and global justice in various critical academic literatures, are easily 
subverted. Instead they subsist within core-periphery frameworks of geopolitical and geo-
economic methodologies driven by methodological nationalism. This methodological 
positionality undermines the ethical basis of peacemaking activity by relating it to refinement 
of interventionary praxis, rather than rights or justice.  
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These dynamics can be observed around three main sites of intervention and knowledge 
related to be peace and peacebuilding in international relations: methodological liberalism, 
which is aimed at constraining methodological nationalism, and in turn aims to represent the 
political claims found in methodological everydayism. The following sections outline these 





Knowledge is a historic battleground for the struggle between the state, its order producing 
systems of intervention (internal and external), and knowledge.7 The state is paradigmatically 
disciplinary. All orders require ordering mechanisms that can deal with and recover from 
political shocks as well as discipline during unexceptional times.8 This is the point of the state, 
with either the goal of national interest at all costs, or national interest without disadvantaging 
others. Both depend upon power-relations and denote negative peace, meaning that peace, 
security and order depended on the balance of power. This helps explain why peace process 
such as that in Cyprus continue for decades: struggles over territorial sovereignty are difficult 
to resolve within the same zero-sum rationality, as the more recent example of the attempt to 
exchange territory in Kosovo also indicates.9 
The post-Cold War liberal international order appeared to represent a complex 
confluence of science, pragmatism, and power aligning the international order with state and 
society. The framework of methodological nationalism privileged the state-based production 
of knowledge about domestic order, about other societies, and about the practices of 
intervention.10 This in turn has replicated the hierarchy of states in international order. It 
developed from state formation processes, soon betraying the inevitable limitations of the 
equation of peace with the balance of power in a state dominated, territorially sovereign order.  
The sovereign approach to intervention, nested in methodological nationalism, saw 
intervention as an exception, designed to maintain hegemony or sovereignty. Intervention was 
directed at internal groups, other states, societies and empires where necessary and according 
to relative power and capacity, including in the production of knowledge. This methodology 
tended to equate academics as the servants of hegemony or imperialism whether at state or 
international level.11 The role of scholarship was to design, refine, and disguise intervention if 
necessary. This approach became necessary in a colonial framework, as well as in an era of 
total war and the failure of national boundaries to halt the spread of violence in the Twentieth 
Century. The conditions of the Cold War necessitated a more subtle approach to intervention, 
however, than the one that existed in the 19th Century Realpolitik or colonial imaginations.  
Methodological nationalism prioritised national interest and connected the production 
of knowledge and frameworks of intervention to maintain and stabilise a territorially sovereign 
order. This methodological phase of international order development offered a negative form 
of peace because of the inequalities and instability of power relations, mirrored in its crude 





The response to the failure of methodological nationalism in a systemic sense of promoting 
peace and order was to try to design a global architecture based upon democratisation and 
human rights. This meant that broad forms of intervention could be designed following 
methodological liberalism, reflected in the post-war frameworks that emerged with 
multilateralism, the UN system, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank, 
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regional actors like the EU, donors, and huge numbers of NGOs, among others. Peace from a 
liberal perspective appeared to involve international and local actors directing their combined 
energies on the state, minimalizing intervention to only when essential to maintain both the 
system and uphold human rights. The expansion of rights driven by subaltern claims also 
necessitated the expansion of the concept of intervention towards a framework that might be 
more associated with governmentality.12 This can be termed peace-as-governance, which has 
expansionary implications for intervention, even when associated with concepts like 
emancipation or justice.13 
This methodological approach underlay the role of the UN and other actors in Bosnia, 
Cambodia, Kosovo, as well as many other post-Cold War cases, where human rights and 
democracy was seen to be a suitable response to the limitations of methodological 
nationalism.14 It was also significant in the Middle East and in Northern Ireland in the 1990s, 
with the former eventually reverting to methodological nationalism and the latter extending 
further into the terrain of methodological everydayism (of which more, below).15 
In the liberal framework different forms of power and knowledge were to be aligned: 
power-to, as in Hobbes;16 power over, as in Weber;17 power despite resistance or power in 
concert as in Arendt;18 and power’s potentiality, as in Lukes,19 were brought together. This led 
to a framework for a relatively benign and static state and international architecture based upon 
territorial sovereignty but domesticated by domestic and international liberal rights, which 
apparently minimised intervention and therefore maintained social and everyday legitimacy. 
Embedded in the state and international architecture, it required subtle forms of intervention 
travelling from western hegemony through international organisations, IFIs and donors, to the 
state, NGOs, and civil society, aligning them in a common framework of rights and democracy. 
The European state was designed to simultaneous disrupt and improve or replace 
organic social order whilst also pacifying and representing it.20 By the twentieth century, the 
project of pacification had extended to the ‘liberal-international’ and  civil society then became 
essential for global rights under liberalism and essential for global markets under 
neoliberalism: both envisioned regulatory dependence upon but also resistance to the state.21 
The production of knowledge about international order thus veered between facilitating 
intervention and protecting autonomy. Intervention as a broad ranging concept and practice 
thus became the inevitable partner of liberal and neoliberal notions of civil society, the 
associated state and international order. Yet, under the conditions of globalisation neither the 
state or the international has been able to mitigate material concerns in conflict-affected 
societies at anything more than a subsistence level. Critical scholarship has long pointed to this 
paradox, but peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development policy is driven by a neoliberal 
premise, as the long history of OECD, World Bank, IMF, and DFID’s  policies indicate. 
Mainstream scholarship disguises and refines the nature of intervention, in other words, under 
the terms of methodological liberalism, which became a form of liberal and neoliberal 
governmentality.22 
This phenomenon has developed into a mix of liberal rights-oriented and neoliberal 
frameworks laid over the states-system and multi-lateral order. A framework for liberal 
intervention was authorised by the UN in the ‘new wars’23 of the early 1990s24  and advanced 
by the end of the decade25 to expand the concept of intervention in line with the requirements 
of relatively elastic concepts of peace, security, peacebuilding, and development, as well as 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.  This shift quickly began 
to foreground conceptions of rights and the everyday in what was otherwise envisioned as a 
liberal international system. Initially, intervention was aimed at producing a liberal peace- as 
in Bosnia, Timor Leste or Kosovo26 whilst overtly maintaining the norm of sovereignty, to 
which human rights would be subservient.27 However, it also encouraged policymakers to 
support subtler, ‘programmatic’ forms of intervention connected to development and 
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modernisation, supporting or driving forward human rights. Rather than overt military or 
political control, these also related to security practices, the rule of law, human rights, 
democratisation and economic reform. They were centred on a peace agreement, security 
arrangements, constitutional reform, development and the engagement of civil society, such as 
with the Dayton Agreement for Bosnia Herzegovina in 1995, which seemed to revolve around 
a state apparatus, but in fact depended upon broad ranging forms of intervention. 
The subsequent ‘interventionary order’ challenged the conceptualisation of peace 
connected to the states-system, the territorial state, its centralised powers, the fixed architecture 
of international system, and occasional intervention through peacekeeping, diplomacy, 
peacebuilding, or via donors and NGOs.  Interventionary processes appear minimalist and 
conservative in that they aim at a limited version of peace and order, as say with the UN roles 
in the 1950s to the 1970s in the Middle East, Cyprus and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
However, they also represent a direct challenge to long-entrenched power structures that 
maintain violence and inequality, ranging across the international and local political and 
economic order. Somewhat counter-intuitively, this helps explain significant resistance to UN 
peacekeeping and other unilateral forms of intervention, even when in the name of peace, 
security, and development.  
These dynamics became even more problematic after Agenda for Peace reached 
doctrinal status in the late 1990s, and it became clear that the concept of peacebuilding would 
require more sophisticated forms of intervention to overcome powerful opposition from 
entrenched elites, as in the Balkans in the 1990s. The contradictions of ideological and 
normative over-extension, local resistance, and limited international resources and political 
will soon led- as with statebuilding projects in the mid 2000s in Iraq and Afghanistan- towards 
complex, neoliberal forms of reason and governmentality,28 drifting away from social and 
liberal understandings of government. These were heavily predicated on intervention aimed at 
both basic state security and the simultaneous production of resilient subjects.29 Consequently, 
through methodological liberalism, intervention had become a norm displacing sovereignty 
and rights as the basis for the production of order and peace. The production of knowledge 
refined ever more subtle frameworks of intervention to support both the stabilisation and 
advancement of a neoliberal order, without changing the existing political hierarchy of states. 
This contradicted the broad thrust of critical scholarship predicated upon uncovering injustice 
and inequality.30 
This undermined the integrity of a fixed, territorial states-system where intervention is 
an exception related mainly to military engagements in war. Intervention became a broad 
ranging but disguised practice of governmentality, through which external actors use an 
underlying ethic of liberal peace to legitimate their various peace, security, and developmental 
projects. This triggered its use across a range of actors in the UN system, the donor system and 
global civil society. Thus, intervention has shifted from its liberal form to permanently 
governing the after-effects of structural forces in more neoliberal terms.  Euphemistically, it 
was soon argued that subtle ‘nudging’ was the best that can be achieved in pragmatic terms.31 
Consequently, the expansion of intervention supported by methodological liberalism 
had the additional consequence of undermining the authority of local actors. It led to local 
consensus about legitimate political authority being displaced by liberal or neoliberal, 
rationalities, supported by externalised tools and power.32 This process extended 
methodological liberalism to produce systems of intervention that operate beyond the realms 
of both the state and the international. Their neoliberal dimensions meant that they are also 
subtle enough to ‘nudge’ in order to avoid resistance, but they do not respond directly to the 
root causes of war and violence. Many of the recent programmatic aspects of peacebuilding, 
and global civil society networks, as well as donor engagements, might be seen in this light. 
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Intervention is either exceptional but frequent under liberalism or a norm and 
camouflaged but constant under neoliberalism. The supposedly exceptional nature of 
intervention under a system of territorial sovereignty has thus increasingly been augmented by 
less visible approaches. It has shifted from the narrow, and visible, liberal exception to the 
camouflaged, regular, and broad neoliberal, norm. Both constitute the international order 
through a range of policy and knowledge frameworks, actor, practices, and institutions but 
underline its growing bifurcation around the quality and nature of order, and its relation to 
justice and peace.  
It is here that a troubling divergence between liberal and critical methodologies have 
emerged. The broadening of interventionary praxis has displaced rather than augmented 
emancipatory thinking as a result. Intervention shapes the production of new knowledge about 
peace, security, development, and order because it is often rooted in hegemonic interests, in a 
post-1990 liberal-idealism, and a circa 2000’s form of neoliberalism. It reifies liberal or state 
methodological approaches, aiming at the alignment of the everyday context and subaltern 






Methodological nationalism and liberalism also require an engagement with everyday life, in 
order to protect national interests, to project human rights, to develop a social contract, and to 
maintain legitimacy and so political authority. They both require detailed knowledge about 
everyday life and politics, if intervention is to be effective, offering a relationship of 
compliance with state or external methodologies, producing hybridity, perhaps in a neo-
trusteeship framework (as in Kosovo after 1999), or autonomy (as in Somaliland to a larger 
degree). As with methodological nationalism and liberalism, the development of an 
epistemology of intervention is designed to solicit knowledge through an engagement with 
anthropology or sociology, often through ethnographic approaches,33 but within existing 
political, economic, and social structures and hegemony as determined by IR’s focus on 
methodological nationalism or liberalism. This means its contribution to peace, justice, and 
order is limited to dominant interests in the international system rather than developing as a 
responsive engagement with subaltern claims as they emerge and expand in everyday life. 
Critical approaches to peace and conflict studies aim at achieving the latter, however. 
 Somewhat problematically, an uncritical and depoliticised version of the everyday is 
often a starting point for a consideration of methodological everydayism.34 This is (often 
mistakenly) connected to early thinking about conflict transformation and resolution, and its 
development through the connection of everyday engagements of peace with social justice. Its 
influence has extended into later discussions about hybrid and everyday forms of peace,35 as 
well as discussions about custom and hybridity,36 care, empathy, and gender in international 
order.37 
As in Northern Ireland, this enabled the alignment or bridging of the conflictual 
positions of international actors, state actors, and civil society actors. It complemented 
methodological liberalism, allowing for an embryonic, transversal and trans-scalar peace 
framework to emerge, in which sectarianism, everyday political claims, the interests of 
involved states (such as the UK and Ireland), and regional umbrellas such as the EU, could be 
mediated to a greater degree than ever before.38 Similar outcomes were also hoped for in 
Bosnia39 but a misalignment between liberal peace, the state, and the everyday became a more 
accurate characterisation in which everyday peace took on a parallel political life and became 
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subject, and even resistant, to intervention rather than aligned with broader notions of justice, 
as in Northern Ireland.40 
The notion of civil society offers a starting point for methodological everydayism from 
a liberal perspective. Its role was to mediate emancipatory interests within the state, placing 
local knowledge and international architecture in a co-produced, interventionary relationship 
both focused on stabilising and improving the state41 through the liberal peace framework. An 
examination of the hierarchy of three bases for knowledge in modernity, including  natural 
sciences and technical interests, historical-hermeneutic sciences and practical interest, and, 
finally, critical sciences and emancipation,42 indicate that everyday, subaltern claims are 
subject to the power relations between these knowledge bases. As agency and social 
transformation cannot be manufactured out of aspiration (or ‘discourse’), but must also have a 
material framework,43 this means that  civil society is either formative of the state or more 
likely is subject to its practical and scientific discipline, as Foucault outlined. Civil society, 
everyday peace and peace formation in this view, must either support methodological 
nationalism or liberalism or be resigned to making futile emancipatory and material claims.44 
This means that any alliance between methodological everydayism, nationalism, and liberalism 
are likely to be hierarchical and antagonistic at best. 
Thus, in practice, peace formation dynamics often contradict the goals of the state and 
international architecture. This can be seen in conflict-affected societies such as Kosovo where 
peace formation has been focused on self-determination and statebuilding:45 in Cyprus where 
it has been focused on ethnic co-existence and unification; and Timor-Leste where it has been 
focused on producing a historical and modern form of legitimacy for a liberal and hybrid form 
of state.46 Only in the case of Northern Ireland is there some sort of alignment, where rights 
and justice have been central, and the major nationalist and sectarian sources of conflict have 
been diminished by ambiguity over governance, territorial sovereignty, and political authority.  
Peace formation highlights everyday emancipatory claims from an everyday, subaltern 
positionality targeted at both the state and the international community while addressing socio-
political level conflicts. These claims may concur with liberal norms, especially with human 
rights and democracy, but they also fall outside of the dominate narratives of peacebuilding 
and statebuilding, enabling the state and the international architecture to block rather than to 
enable them. Peace formation claims may be material, structural, and ontologically different, 
compared to liberal-rights based claims because of differing modes of political community: for 
example, through custom, through religion, through patronage structures: or as in Kosovo for 
a secessionary state, in BiH for material improvement, and across the MENA region during the 
‘Arab Spring’, for social advancement, rights, democracy and identity. Consequently, ‘local 
knowledge’ may challenge methodological nationalism, which connects to national interests 
and elite power, and methodological liberalism, which also relates to global hegemony. 
Thus, methodological everydayism has quite different dynamics to nationalist and 
liberal versions in terms of the relationship between knowledge, power, and intervention. 
Connecting with either tends to result in its co-optation, but separation means it is relatively 
powerless even if this means it retains its normative integrity relating to micro epistemologies 
and methodologies. Ironically, scholars in diverse fields, point to long-standing evidence they 
have produced (often ignored by policymakers) about the obstacles to emancipation,  indicating 
the over-riding need for critical research on subaltern claims and their blockages (which may 
emanate from methodological nationalism and liberalism). The concept of the subaltern thus 
offers a key critique from below of structural problems, as documented in a wide range of 
sources across disciplines. Such voices tend to argue that national or liberal-international policy 
is based upon a narrow standpoint supporting an unjust social and state hierarchy and suffers 
from international ‘provincialism’ in post-colonial terms47 from an everyday perspective. 
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Subaltern claims in everyday methodological frameworks are highly politicised, and 
often aim to moderate or reform both national and liberal knowledge and interventionary 
praxis. Critical scholarship either seeks to map out the everyday in the context of adverse 
power-relations, or to engage with its subaltern claims against unaccountable power. The latter 
implies the expansion of rights beyond liberal understandings and represents a challenge to 
geo-political formulations of international and state power. Thus, methodological everydayism 
cannot be aligned with methodological nationalism or liberalism except through force or 




From Practicality to Interventionary Knowledge 
 
What might be termed ‘interventionary knowledge’, driven by practical requirements, can 
therefore be organised around three main methodological approaches: methodological 
nationalism, where dominant interests drive interventionary practices and are derived from the 
states and states-system; methodological liberalism, in which liberal norms drive intervention 
from the international level for human rights and democracy or trade, as well as shaping 
domestic political interactions; and methodological everydayism, in which everyday practices, 
norms, and politics shape intervention and its critique from the perspective of emancipation 
and expanding rights.  
All three are associated with different disciplinary areas: political science, political 
philosophy, IPE and IR, anthropology and sociology, respectively. All three versions have 
developed their own methods, norms, and aims. There has been an assumption that while they 
all remain normatively aligned with liberal peace then they will also be legitimate at the 
everyday level. They may then act as a check and a balance on the dynamics of violence in a 
state or region, thus reducing the negative impact of the imbalances caused by state and 
international power, influence and capacity, when measured against the claims and capacities 
of the conflict-affected everyday. However, it is also clear that the power relations between 
these different methodologies that underlie intervention means that the international and state 
levels are most significant, and the everyday can only offer claims against the state or the 
international when it has a strong alliance with one or the other: this means it is often co-opted. 
To alter this unequal epistemological relationship in order to reflect subaltern claims for 
expanded rights would involve deep structural change of the state and international system, 
indeed of methodological liberalism (and neoliberalism) and methodological nationalism. It is 
unfeasible to expect methodological everydayism to carry such weight without intervention. 
The three methodologies claim epistemological support and ontological credibility, 
even though they contradict each other. In neoliberal terms, they are aligned by the goals of a 
secure state anchored in global governance, which provides the interventionary framework for 
the ‘resilient subject’ to prosper, but perhaps not for direct structural change related to rights 
and justice. Consequently, intervention itself has become a conservative but wide-spread 
practice aimed at mitigating the problems of the states-system, international order, and global 
capital, reflecting the power relations that exist between liberal, state, and everyday 
methodological positions. This is reflected in imitations of IMF and World Bank structural 
adjustment practices from the 1980s48 in subsequent development, UN peacebuilding, 
statebuilding, R2P, donor and global civil society frameworks, and related interventionary 
practices. It is deeply rooted in the post-WW2 evolution of western economic and political 
hegemony and its extended engagement with its others.49 By taking this path it is closely related 
to older colonial practices and offers a choice between governmentality and justice, or an 
attempt to conflate the two with state or international governance. 
10 
 
There is a long history behind the disdain of policymakers and practitioners for theory 
and scholarship that does not makes its practical value according to hegemonic goals clear. The 
‘practical man’ is suspicious of what he may regard as complex theory, is focused on means, 
assumes the political debate over ends is settled, and is unconcerned about everyday social or 
historical context. This has left the liberal international order delegitimated, and even more 
dependent upon a wide range of interventionary practices, which in turn have become more 
and more politicised. The liberal international architecture has responded by calling upon 
scholars to assist them in expanding an interventionary system, driven by a bureaucratic, 
neoliberal and technological rationality. This has not bridged the different sources of legitimate 
authority (local, state, and international, political, social, or economic), as was originally 
envisioned in liberal discussions of social and international contracts, however.50 Knowledge 
production is part of the political process of global governance and its ‘epistocracy’.51 
Dominant assumptions  about where the line is drawn between what is intervention and when 
it occurs, are supported by elite group-think, standard operating procedures, class and cultural 
commonalities amongst global policymakers and elites, and neoliberal ideological assumptions 
about the proper nature of social, economic, and political order, post-1945 and 1990. Thus, the 
concept of non-intervention is a theoretical cover for broader interventionary knowledge, for 
the purposes of peace, order, security and modernisation, which incidentally maintains 
historically produced inequalities through the ‘rule of experts’.52 
Power to remake international relations has thus become aligned with liberal and 
nationalist knowledge and their methods of intervention, from the local to the global. This 
alignment is sufficient to quell the reactions of subaltern subjects as well as to shape the state 
and control peace and security, as can be seen in the examples of intervention from BiH in 
1995 to Iraq in 2004, in which international governance followed military intervention.53 
Recently intervention has augmented insecurity with new types of biopolitical precarity 
because of its association with neoliberalism rather than human rights, making its legitimacy 
even more difficult to sustain.54 There is also now disagreement about the best international 
model of state for peace (sovereign, liberal democracy or authoritarian capitalist): whether 
remote and automated (i.e. built into less-than-sovereign states) forms of intervention are 
necessary to maintain them; and, if and how far local consent is required for contemporary 
legitimate authority. The logic of intervention is such that it appears to confirm the state, 
supported by external authority, legitimated elsewhere (the UN Security Council, the EU, state 
donors, INGOs, or the regional hegemon, for example). Increasingly states are the recipients 
of waves of intervention and social actors direct their agency at both the state and at formal 
interveners. A complex picture thus emerges of contemporary intervention and its associated 
methods and epistemologies. The ‘practical man’ referred to in the epigraph above, turns out 
to be the man (or woman) who does not question structural injustice. This illustrates how 
intervention as an evolving framework in international order has always been related to power 
and its epistemology and is currently related to global governance rather than global justice.55 
Its disguise allows it to side step global justice’s historical and distributive qualities. Making 
intervention a practical tool has made it central to international order, often against the grain of 
political legitimacy.  
Thus, international governance, through the UN, donor, political and financial systems, 
has moved its focus from intervention as an exceptional event to long-term, but limited 
management from afar. Intervention is now constituted by international ‘programming’56 of 
the social and the state, through international agencies, development banks, donors, NGOs, and 
the military, utilising as much new technology as possible.57 It is led by core states and 
institutions. Applied research, at the apogee of the knowledge production chain, is essential for 
interventionary power and the order it seeks to produce. Scholarship and research are relegated 
to the secondary aims of the maintenance rather than transformation of the existing politico-
11 
 
ethical order, mediating the contradictory forces of security, territorial sovereignty and capital, 
rather than reflecting social claims for expanded rights.58  
Intervention has become a norm for most liberal policy makers and many critical 
scholars, connected to the maintenance and slow improvement of domestic and international 
order, meaning methodological liberalism is its main driver. For a second, more conservative 
group it requires to geopolitical ‘programming’ as a form of global trusteeship and 
counterinsurgency, driven by methodological nationalism. For a third, post or anti-colonial 
group, rarely represented in global institutions or in knowledge production, intervention is a 
constant process of power relations that needs to be uncovered and challenged.  
Basing intervention on practice, without an ethical framework for understanding the 
goals or order it produces, has led to a situation where practical scholarship across a range of 
disciplines is deflected from the great political and justice questions of peaceful order. This 
supports sovereign and structural power, which are often combined directly under 
contemporary globalisation and global governance to make the claim that deeper structural 
reform is impossible (and indeed unnatural).59 The interventionary system means that deeper 
structural change- as might be demanded by the global justice rationality that emerges from a 
subaltern perspective- can be avoided through constant interventions which nudge the current 
system along, but which also blocks everyday aspirations for global justice. This undermines 
its social legitimacy.60 Expert knowledge is essential for aligned, scalar systems of 
governmentality, from ‘local ownership’ to ‘decentralisation’, neoliberal statebuilding, and 
regional normative, soft, and global power.61 It points to an underlying premise that societies 
need to accept their current structural situation (i.e. in geopolitical, geo-economic, human 
development, and so global justice, terms). Thus, peacebuilding and development might be 
called ‘resilience training’: conflict-affected subjects are expected to restrain their own political 
expectations while political, economic, and social reforms are guided by external actors (such 
as the UN, the IFIs, donors, or NGOs) heavily influenced by methodological liberalism or 
nationalism. 
This is all problematic because historical and distributive, global justice issues have not 
been solved. Emancipatory and evidence-based calls from scholars, from within social 
movements, and many other organisations worldwide, desire knowledge to be used to enable 
intervention into the broad power-structures that block social emancipation on a world-wide 
scale.62 Power-relations in this sense are a contest of geopolitics and geo-economics (i.e. direct, 
structural and governmental power) against a Foucauldian field of (subaltern) everyday social 
forces.63 These positions relate respectively to peace as a realist balance of power, where 
intervention is limited to just-war positions because peace and order are very basic: liberal 
peace where rights, humanitarian, developmental, peacebuilding, statebuilding and R2P 
positions on  intervention inevitably  emerge; and critical positions pointing to the materiality 
of inequality, and social justice. The latter points to hybridity, mobility, networks, 
environmentalism, and global justice (historical and distributive) as the basis for peace.64 This 
shifts the nexus of peace from geopolitics, democracy, law and institutions, nudging and broad 
processes of intervention, following the path of methodological liberalism and nationalism, 
towards global justice following the path of the methodological everyday. 
Yet, pragmatic policymakers tend to see critical scholars as engaging in counter-
conduct if they develop methodological everydayism. Critical scholars in turn tend to respond 
to the forces of eternal sovereignty or capital by pointing to medium- and long-term problems 
of instability, to normative matters related to rights, inequality, environmentalism, and identity, 
and related questions of viable progress65 supported by methodological nationalism and 
liberalism. This is expressed as a powerful critique of various high-level projects for a peace 
settlement such as in Cyprus, and peacebuilding and state building, as in Kosovo and Timor.66 
Another problem arises in the context of southern knowledge.67 Power in these terms has been 
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translated into knowledge associated with the control of methodological nationalism and 
capture of methodological everydayism by methodological liberalism.  
Since 1989 social claims for intervention have challenged elite, state, and international 
power-structures, while programmatic forms of intervention have in turn challenged social 
claims for justice. Thus, nationalist, state-centric knowledge in IR is inevitably counter-
insurgency knowledge (i.e. methodological nationalism), which aims at disrupting civil society 
and its control through liberal governmentality, corralling knowledge production in the 
process.68 This prevents counter-conduct and emancipatory agency from crossing over from 





Narrowly defined, intervention is thus normally understood in the context of fixed sovereignty 
and geopolitics (methodological nationalism), extended into liberal terrains by UN 
peacebuilding and R2P-type doctrines (methodological liberalism). Intervention, knowledge 
and peace and order are state driven. Thus, emancipation can be effectively redefined as self-
help and resilience, where intervention nudges subtly through capitalist rationalities. More 
broadly defined, intervention may be understood to have emancipatory goals (methodological 
liberalism) within the confines of liberal rationality, which has also driven forward 
methodological everydayism, which aims to transcend the limits of sovereignty and the 
international normative order in order to advance a global justice framework.70 It thus may 
span a broad range of practices, from the military to the economic, and social. Short term and 
long-term perspectives differ in the context of structural change: that is, not only maintaining 
the system according to hegemonic intent, but also improving it according to subaltern claims 
and knowledge about justice and sustainability. 
Critical scholarship illustrates that seeing a static view of the international order makes 
practices of intervention appear to be occasional, necessary, and considered.71 They appear to 
represent an exercise of power to preserve the state or international architecture, and where this 
is not possible to reduce conflict to a minimum, preventing the need for structural change.72 
Liberal methodology in its Kantian form,73 provides the intellectual framework in which this 
is reconciled, whether through blue-print driven standard operating procedures and pathway 
dependency, or through reforms, new policy shifts, and so on. Foucault made this clear in his 
work on the intimate and obscure relationship between knowledge and (capillary) power.74 
Thus, most mainstream research and related government policy are designed to make the 
subaltern fit into its interventionary paradigms, rather than to take account of its expanding 
claims.75 It generally rejects local voices and critical scholarship as impractical or ‘radical’, it 
cannot engage properly with networks, mobility, or vertical, and transversal relationships, or 
claims, when they are not couched within the liberal or national system or defer to its 
hierarchies. Nor can it comprehend the constitutive nature of ongoing interventionary practices. 
Evidence-based research and policy simply recycle the causal factors of conflict and structural 
violence under the current hegemony as if it was homeostatic. They reiterate its fixity and 
attempt to sharpen its visible and invisible tools of intervention.76 They cannot engage with the 
entwined and complex agency that emerges through methodological everydayism.77 Such 
epistemological revisions require methodological and ontological alterations. This cannot be 
achieved by ‘practical men’, for whom intervention is a conservative rather than critical force. 
Critical scholars are often unwilling to risk being tainted by interventionary praxis, but clearly, 
they refer, partly through the subaltern, to a historical, disciplinary, and ethical store of 
knowledge on a broad scale: they are often connected to local actors who make subaltern claims 
against, or on behalf, of the interventionary system.  
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Through a critical epistemology, as emerges via methodological everydayism, 
intervention is perceived as a norm which is ambiguous about the way sovereignty and 
international architecture may maintain injustice and block global justice to overcome 
historical power-relations. The emergence of a range of tools and programmes to maintain and 
repair order (such as statebuilding and good governance programmes, peacekeeping, 
peacebuilding, donors, civil society, and development) make this plausible. It also explains the 
historical layers of intervention that have shaped the modern state or regional system in the 
Middle East or Sub-Saharan Africa, for example.78 Concepts such as development, R2P, 
democratisation, and peacebuilding are the open expression of this underlying dynamic. 
Critical scholarship has long argued that higher-level states in the UNDP Global Development 
Index and the geopolitical hierarchy practice intervention as a constant on lower states. Most 
international programming actors, including transnational actors, are agents of dominant states, 
within the framing of the modern ‘Anglo-sphere’79 and Euro-centric thought on 
modernization. Methodological everydayism has uncovered how the states-system, the 
international system, regionalisation, and global capital increasingly require forms of 
knowledge (realism, rational-legal-institutionalism, integration, neoliberalism) that can smooth 
out their internal inconsistencies. Thus, the aims of peacebuilding, statebuilding, development, 
and recent stabilisation policies80 are to utilise practical and theoretical knowledge to produce 
such forms of continuous intervention in a shifting, networked, and multi-scalar framework.81 
Somewhat ironically, an interventionary epistemology resists global justice while 
claiming to be vital for emancipation. It simultaneously rejects non-elite, non-western, 
participatory and democratic demands for historical and distributive justice and deeper 
structural reform. Yet, methodological everydayism provided the platform for human rights 
and democracy in the Twentieth Century and the subtext of the Sustainable Development Goals 
more recently. It has facilitated a connection between emancipatory knowledge and structural 
change, making wider claims for emancipation within the praxis of intervention.82 
This explains in part Foucault’s biopolitical and governmentality approaches and 
connects them directly to the networked agency and capillary power now commonly thought 
of in the context of civil society, the state, and a range of transnational organisations.83 An 
interventionary system works through layers of governmentality, from local to global. This 
would also explain the circulation of power and norms, the complicated networks of global 
governance, the possibility of local resistance, and a whole range of assumptions about 
emergent fluid, relational dynamics even in the midst of eternal sovereignty and international 
architecture.84 It helps unravel the palimpsest layers of the international system, which have 
been based upon some fixed core states, intervention, and a fluid periphery.85 Methodological 
everydayism draws on a mix of personal sovereignty, relationality, networks, and growing 
agency and ‘ungovernmentality’,86 promoting scalar and spatial, transversal and transnational 
mobility utilising enormous amounts of information.87 This represents an emerging agenda for 
peace, connected to global justice in the 21st Century, and inevitably also partly conducted 





“Expert rule mobilises knowledge as power.”88 
 
Scholarship that is focused on a dealing with the inconsistencies outlined above tend to point 
to the following five elements:  
 
(i) the balance between global capital, political, social, and economic rights:  
14 
 
(ii) identity and pluralism;  
(iii) environmental sustainability; 
(iv) Global (historical, distributive, gender and environmental) justice; 
(v) mobility, scale, and networks. 
 
These five points indicate that waves of intervention, both conservative and progressive, move 
along networks related to power, knowledge, rights, justice and mobility, across scales, levels, 
and borders. Thus, peace, security, and related praxis has to engage with much bigger questions 
of global justice.89 One the one hand, intervention carries its own ideological stances, points to 
groupthink and SOPs, supports institutional frameworks, and professional and national 
advantages. On the other hand, critical engagement with intervention can deflect the 
development of trusteeship or ‘native administration’ type accompaniments and amplify the 
critiques of the subaltern aimed at epistemic power-relations, expanding political claims for 
rights, and their understanding of the need for interventionary support.90 Thus, more relational 
and multi-dimensional methods and epistemologies are required.91 
The liberal international order has been the most successful peace architecture ever, and 
methodological liberalism has met the challenge of methodological nationalism by establishing 
a complex system of intervention as a nexus of power that could tame geopolitics, imperialism, 
and civil war. The “international order” has thus become interventionary rather than non-
interventionary- a legal fiction at best,92 and the peace it has produced is uneven and fragile 
when viewed from the perspective of methodological everydayism. Subaltern views of power 
and intervention as being formative of political order point to far broader issues of global justice 
as a consequence.93 
There is no escaping the complex logic of the interventionary order: undoing it is to 
risk war,94 but accepting it requires ever more complex and sophisticated checks and balances, 
to make sure that conflict-affected polities build legitimacy and order in the context of global 
justice rather than geo-political interests. As the critical peace debates advance towards a closer 
connection with global justice, they may also be more dependent on broad and complex 
systems and practices of intervention, producing a paradox that threatens the legitimacy of the 
concept of peace itself.95 This explains the recent shift from methodological liberalism to 
everyday, micro-level frameworks, with its potential and its risks. The intervention- 
knowledge- peace nexus has driven scholarship towards supporting what Foucault called the 
‘reason of least state’ in which civil society plays a vital role as a check and balance on 
despotism,96 requiring global and benign hegemony to support them. Nevertheless, the 
international community has stepped back from supporting social peace or global justice, 
instead relying on power-sharing frameworks (e.g. illiberal states as in Cambodia or Bosnia). 
Thus, peacebuilding praxis, rather than meet the challenge of methodological everydayism, has 
engaged with neoliberal rationalities, which in turn have driven it back to methodological 
nationalism.  
In historical terms, the evolution of methodologies of intervention might be seen as first 
an attempt at the direct control of others through imperialism and colonialism: then the 
dissemination of similar state forms through decolonisation, peace processes, peacekeeping, 
peacebuilding and statebuilding, as could be seen in the 1990s in Bosnia and Kosovo; and then 
the refinement- and failure- of interventionary practices to reinforce or maintain liberal or 
neoliberal control as occurred in the 2000s in Afghanistan. It has attracted new technologies of 
power, ironically aimed more at containment as in Libya or Syria. Each step along this path 
seems to undermine the ethical basis of peacebuilding, but also to amplify the need to connect 
them with developing post-colonial conceptions of global justice.97 This implies the 
advancement of relational ontology as the basis an emancipatory peace, security and order in 
view of broad conceptions of intervention related to mobility, networks, transversality, and 
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related types of agency. No power is constructed or exercised without its entangled oppositions. 
No agency survives without entanglement in other agencies and their complexity.98 Thus, peace 
represents a long process of mutual and entangled interventions, agencies, networks and 
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